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Abstract
A multi-secret sharing scheme allows several secrets to be shared amongst a group of participants. In 2005, Shao and
Cao developed a verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme where each participant’s share can be used several times which
reduces the number of interactions between the dealer and the group members. In addition, some secrets may require a
higher security level than others involving the need for different threshold values. Recently, Chan and Chang designed
such a scheme but their construction only allows a single secret to be shared per threshold value.
In this article, we combine the previous two approaches to design a multiple time verifiable multi-secret sharing scheme
where several secrets can be shared for each threshold value. Since the running time is an important factor for practical
applications, we will provide a complexity comparison of our combined approach with respect to the previous schemes.
Keywords: Secret Sharing Scheme, Threshold Access Structures, Share Verifiability, Chinese Remainder Theorem, Keyed
One-Way Functions.
1 Introduction
In 1979, Blakley and Shamir independently invented (t, n)-threshold secret sharing schemes in order to facilitate the dis-
tributed storage of secret data in an unreliable environment [1, 18]. Such a scheme enables an authority called dealer to
distribute a secret s as shares amongst n participants in such a way that any group of minimum size t can recover s while
no groups having at most t− 1 members can get any information about s.
Sometimes, however, several secrets have to be shared simultaneously. A basic idea consists of using a (t, n)-threshold
scheme as many times as the number of secrets. This approach, however, is memory consuming. As noticed by Chien et
al. [4], multi-secret sharing schemes can be used to overcome this drawback. In such a construction, multiple secrets are
protected using the same amount of data usually needed to protect a single secret. Multi-secret sharing schemes can be
classified into two families: one-time schemes and multiple time schemes [12]. One-time schemes imply the dealer must
redistribute new shares to every participant once some particular secrets have been reconstructed. Such a redistribution
process can be very costly both in time and resources, in particular, when the group size n gets large as it may be the case
in group-oriented cryptography [6].
Several constructions of multiple time schemes have been achieved [4, 25]. Nevertheless, they have the drawback that a
dishonest dealer who distributes incorrect shares or a malicious participant who submits an invalid share to the combiner
∗The original version of this paper appears in the proceedings of the 3rd SKLOIS Conference on Information Security and Cryptology (INSCRYPT
2007), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4990, pp 167 - 181, Springer - Verlag, 2008.
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prevents the secrets from being reconstructed. The idea of robust computational secret sharing schemes was introduced by
Krawczyk [14] to deal with this problem. Several such protocols were developed. Harn designed a verifiable multi-secret
sharing scheme [10] which was extended by Lin and Wu [15]. In [3], Chang et al. recently improved that construction
even further by providing resistance against cheating by malicious participants and reducing the computational complexity
with respect to [10, 15]. The security of that scheme relies on the intractability of both factorization and discrete logarithm
problem modulo a composite number. In [25], another multi-secret sharing scheme was developed by Yang et al. As [4],
its security is based on the existence of keyed one-way functions introduced by Gong in [9]. Shao and Cao recently ex-
tended Yang et al.’s scheme by providing the verification property and reducing the number of public values[19].
It may occur that the same group of n participants share several secrets related to different threshold values according
to their importance. As an example, consider that an army commander requests a strike to be executed and transmits the
order to a group of 10 generals. One can imagine that any pair of officers can reconstruct the coordinates of the target and
then initialize the process by mobilizing the appropriate equipment (plane, submarine, missile) but only subsets of 8 out
of 10 generals can get access to the bomb activation code and launch the strike. Recently Chan and Chang designed such
a construction [2] but it only allows a single secret to be shared per threshold value.
In this article, we propose a generalization of [2, 19] by introducing a Verifiable Multi-Threshold Multi-secret Sharing
Scheme (VMTMSS) where several secrets can be shared per threshold value. The security of our multiple time scheme is
guaranteed as soon as keyed one-way functions and collision resistant one-way functions exist. In the previous situation,
our VMTMSS would enable any pair of generals to have access to target location, launch time, type of weapon to be used
while any subset of 8 out of 10 officers can recover the bomb code as well as the commander’s digital signature [20] as
the approval for the strike. This example also emphasizes the need for computational efficiency. Therefore we will also
provide an analysis of the computational cost of our construction.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will recall the polynomial interpolation problem as well as
Garner’s algorithm since they will have an important role in our construction. In Section 3, we will describe our multi-
secret sharing scheme and prove its soundness. In Section 4, we will analyze the computational complexity of our approach
and compare it to the cost of the two constructions from [2, 19]. The last section will summarize the benefits of our
construction.
2 Preliminaries
In this part, we recall two problems which will play an important role in proving the soundness and efficiency of the
scheme we describe in Section 3.
2.1 Interpolating Points
Assume that we are given λ points (x1, y1), . . . , (xλ, yλ) such that the xi’s are distinct in a field K. The Lagrange interpo-
lating polynomial Lλ(X) is the only polynomial of degree at most λ−1 passing through the previous λ points. Algorithm
4.6.1 from [8] computes the λ coefficients of Lλ(X) using 5 (λ−1)
2
2 field operations in K.
We now consider that we work over the finite field Z/pZ for some prime number p. In this field, an addition/subtraction
requires O(log2 p) bit operations and a multiplication needs O(log22 p) bit operations. Using Algorithm 14.61 and Note
14.64 from [16], an inversion can be performed in O(log22 p) bit operations as well. Therefore, the λ coefficients of Lλ(X)
can be obtained using O(λ2 log22 p) bit operations.
2.2 Solving the Chinese Remainder Problem
We first recall the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT):
Theorem 1 Let m1, . . . ,mλ be λ coprime integers and denote M their product. For any λ-tuple of integers (v1, . . . , vλ),
there exists a unique x in Z/MZ such that: 

x ≡ v1 mod m1
.
.
.
.
.
.
x ≡ vλ mod mλ
Solving the Chinese remainder problem is reconstructing the unique x in Z/MZ once v1, . . . , vλ and m1, . . . ,mλ are
given. This can be achieved thanks to Garner’s algorithm [16]. Based on Note 14.74, its running time is O(λ log22 M) bit
operations.
2
3 Our Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme
We assume that we have n participants P1, . . . , Pn and ℓ distinct threshold values t1, . . . , tℓ. Consider we have ℓ distinct
prime numbers p1, . . . , pℓ. For each i in {1, . . . , ℓ} we denote Si 1, . . . , Si ki the ki secrets of the (ti, n)-threshold scheme.
Without loss of generality we can assume that those ki secrets belong to Z/piZ. We first introduce the following definition:
Definition 1 A function f : R+ → R+ is said to be negligible if:
∀α > 0∃ζ0 ∈ R
+ : ∀ζ > ζ0 f(ζ) < ζ
−α
We have the following definition adapted from Definition 13.2 [20].
Definition 2 A threshold multi-secret sharing scheme for threshold value t is a method of sharing k secrets S1, . . . , Sk
among a set of n participants {P1, . . . , Pn} in such a way that the following properties are satisfied:
(i) (soundness) If at least t participants pool their shares together then they recover the whole k secrets S1, . . . , Sk.
(ii) (secrecy) If at most t − 1 participants pool their shares together then they do not recover the whole k secrets with
non-negligible probability as a function of the secret’s size.
The reader may notice that Definition 13.2 is related to perfect secrecy since it is there assumed that the coalition of
t− 1 participants does not know anything about the secret value (i.e. all values are equally probable). This cannot be held
here as several secrets will be shared using the same polynomial. Nevertheless we will see that t − 1 participants cannot
recover the whole k secrets with good probability. We can generalize the previous definition as follows:
Definition 3 A multiple-threshold multi-secret sharing scheme for threshold values t1, . . . , tℓ is a method of sharing
k1+ · · ·+kℓ secrets S1 1, . . . , Sℓ kℓ among a set of n participants {P1, . . . , Pn} in such a way that the following properties
are satisfied:
(i) (soundness) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, if at least ti participants pool their shares together then they recover the whole
ki secrets Si 1, . . . , Si ki .
(ii) (secrecy) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, if at most ti − 1 participants pool their shares together then they do not recover
the whole ki secrets Si 1, . . . , Si ki with non-negligible probability as a function of the secret’s size.
A verifiable multiple-threshold multi-secret sharing scheme (VMTMSS) is a multiple-threshold multi-secret sharing
scheme for which the validity of the share can be publicly verifiable. Let us introduce the following definition from [9]:
Definition 4 A function f(·, ·) that maps a key and a second bit string of a fixed length is a secure keyed one-way hash
function if it satisfies the following five properties:
P1: Given k and x, it is easy to compute f(k, x).
P2: Given k and f(k, x), it is hard to compute x.
P3: Without knowledge of k, it is hard to compute f(k, x) for any x.
P4: Given k, it is hard to find two distinct values x and y such that f(k, x) = f(k, y).
P5: Given (possibly many) pairs (x, f(k, x)), it is hard to compute k.
Remark, however, this secure keyed one-way function is not equivalent to the two-variable one-way function defined by
He and Dawson in [11] contrary to what claimed Chien et al. [4]. Indeed, the collision resistance property P4 of the keyed
one-way function is not a requirement for the functions created by He and Dawson (see Definition 1 in [11]).
We assume that we have ℓ such functions f1, . . . , fℓ whose respective domains are D1, . . . ,Dℓ. Without loss of generality
we can assume that the prime numbers p1, . . . , pℓ are chosen such that: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} fi(Di) ⊂ Z/piZ. We also assume:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} Di ⊂ Z/piZ × Z/piZ. We need to use a collision resistant hash function H [17]. As in [13], it will be
used to check the validity of the shares.
Our approach will consist of two steps. First, we will treat each (ti, n)-threshold scheme separately. We build a polynomial
Fi(X) whose degree and coefficients will be determined similarly to [25]. Second, we will combine the ℓ polynomials
F1(X), . . . , Fℓ(X) using the following result obtained by extending Corollary 3.2 from [2]:
Corollary 1 (Polynomial form of CRT) Let m1, . . . ,mλ be λ coprime integers and denote their product by M . For any
λ-tuple of polynomials (A1(X), . . . , Aλ(X)) from Z/m1Z[X]×· · ·×Z/mλZ[X], there exists a unique polynomialA(X)
in Z/MZ[X] such that: 

A(X) ≡ A1(X) mod m1
.
.
.
.
.
.
A(X) ≡ Aλ(X) mod mλ
(1)
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In addition: deg(A(X)) = max
i∈{1,...,λ}
(deg(Ai(X))).
Proof.
In [2], Chan and Chang proved the existence of such a polynomial A(X). What remains to demonstrate is its uniqueness
and the value of its degree.
Let A(X) be a polynomial from Z/MZ[X] solution of System (1) and denote α its degree. The ring isomorphism:
Z/MZ ≃ Z/m1Z× · · · × Z/mλZ (2)
involves α = max
i∈{1,...,λ}
(deg(Ai(X))) since Isomorphism (2) implies an element µ is congruent to 0 in Z/MZ if and only
if µ is congruent to 0 in each Z/miZ for i ∈ {1, . . . , λ}.
Let A(X) and A˜(X) be two solutions of System (1). Since their degree is α, we can write them as:
A(X) :=
α∑
i=0
aiX
i and A˜(X) :=
α∑
i=0
a˜iX
i
where the ai’s and a˜i’s are elements of Z/MZ. Since these polynomials are solutions of System (1) and due to
Isomorphism (2), we deduce: ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , α} ai ≡ a˜i mod M .

The previous proof involves that A(X) can be computed from A1(X), . . . , Aλ(X) using Garner’s algorithm α+1 times.
We will now present the details of our construction.
3.1 Scheme Construction
Our construction consists of three algorithms: SetUp, ShareConstruction and SecretReconstruction. The first two algo-
rithms will be run by the dealer while the last one will be executed by the combiner. As in [4, 19], SetUp will only be run
once while ShareConstruction will be called each time new secrets are to be shared. The private elements distributed to
the n participants by the dealer when running SetUp will ensure that our VMTMSS is a multiple time scheme.
Algorithm 1 SetUp
Input: The group size n and ℓ distinct prime numbers p1, . . . , pℓ.
1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, generate n distinct elements of Z/piZ denoted si 1, . . . , si n.
2. Use Garner’s algorithm as: ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}Sj := Garner(s1 j , . . . , sℓ j , p1, . . . , pℓ).
3. Distribute Sj to participant Pj over a secure channel for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Output: The n private values S1, . . . ,Sn which will be used by the participants to check the validity of their pseudo-
shares.
We have the following observation concerning [4, 19]. Each of the n participants Pi receives a secret value si. The dealer
chooses a random element r and evaluates the pseudo-shares f(r, s1), . . . , f(r, sn) where f is the keyed one-way func-
tion used in those schemes. He builds a polynomial h(X) whose k lowest degree coefficients represent the k secrets to
be shared. Finally he publishes r, h(f(r, s1)), . . . , h(f(r, sn)) so that the combiner can verify the validity of shares. In
order to ensure the multiple time property of their construction, a new value r is generated each time a new set of k secrets
is to be shared. If r is chosen such that f(r, si0) is 0 then Pi0 can recover one of the secrets as the constant term of the
polynomial h(X) from the list of public elements since: h(0) = h(f(r, si0)). Even if the probability of such an event is
negligible when the domain of f is large, it is still easy to deal with this problem by shifting each coefficient of the poly-
nomial h(X) by one position and setting up the new constant term as a random element. This is at the cost of publishing
an extra point to reconstruct h(X) since its degree has increased by 1.
We will now introduce our algorithm ShareConstruction. We first introduce the following notation:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} δi :=
{
0 if ti ≥ ki
ki − ti otherwise
Notice that δi can be computed as soon as both ti and ki are known. ShareConstruction is represented as Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 ShareConstruction
Input: The group size n, the prime numbers p1, . . . , pℓ, the threshold values t1, . . . , tℓ, the number of secrets k1, . . . , kℓ,
the corresponding secrets S1 1, . . . , S1 k1 , . . . , Sℓ 1, . . . , Sℓ kℓ , the functions f1, . . . , fℓ, the elements s1 1, . . . , sℓ n from
SetUp and the collision resistant hash function H .
1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, pick uniformly at random an element ri from Z/piZ. Use Garner’s algorithm as: R :=
Garner(r1, . . . , rℓ, p1, . . . , pℓ).
2. Do the following:
2.1. Compute fi(ri, si j) for i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
2.2. Compute the hashes H(fi(ri, si j)) for i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and publish them as table TH.
2.3. Use Garner’s algorithm as: ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} Pj := Garner(f1(r1, s1 j), . . . , fℓ(rℓ, sℓ j), p1, . . . , pℓ).
3. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} do the following:
3.1. Pick uniformly at random an element Ci from Z/piZ.
3.2. If ti > ki then:
Pick uniformly at random ui 1, . . . , ui δi from Z/piZ and build the polynomial: Fi(X) := Ci +
ki∑
j=1
Si j X
j +
ti−ki∑
j=1
ui j X
j+ki
.
Else
Build the polynomial: Fi(X) := Ci +
ki∑
j=1
Si j X
j
.
4. Denote D := max
i∈{1,...,ℓ}
(deg(Fi(X))). For each i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, write Fi(X) as: Fi(X) :=
D∑
j=0
Fi j X
j
where: ∀j ∈ {deg(Fi(X)) + 1, . . . ,D} Fi j = 0. Use Garner’s algorithm as: ∀j ∈ {0, . . . ,D} Fj :=
Garner(F1 j , . . . , Fℓ j , p1, . . . , pℓ).
5. Build the polynomial F(X) as: F(X) :=
D∑
j=0
Fj X
j and compute F(P1), . . . ,F(Pn).
6. Do the following:
6.1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, generate an element ai from Z/piZ distinct from si 1, . . . , si n.
6.2. Use Garner’s algorithm as: A := Garner(f1(r1, a1), . . . , fℓ(rℓ, aℓ), p1, . . . , pℓ).
6.3. Compute F(A).
7. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} such that δi > 0 do the following:
7.1. Generate δi elements s′i 1, . . . , s′i δi such that si 1, . . . , si n, ai, s
′
i 1, . . . , s
′
i δi
are n + 1 + δi distinct elements of
Z/piZ.
7.2. Compute fi(ri, s′i 1), . . . , fi(ri, s′i δi).
7.3. Compute Fi(fi(ri, s′i 1)), . . . , Fi(fi(ri, s′i δi)).
8. Publish the table T containing R,F(P1), . . . ,F(Pn), (A,F(A)) as well as the couples
(fi(ri, s
′
i 1), Fi(fi(ri, s
′
i 1))), . . . , (fi(ri, s
′
i δi
), Fi(fi(ri, s
′
i δi
))) for each i such that δi > 0.
Output: The table TH which will be used to verify the pseudo-shares and the table T which will be used to reconstruct
the secrets of our VMTMSS.
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Notice that (A,F(A)) is the extra point needed to overcome the problem from [19]. We also remark that any participant
Pj can compute the pseudo-shares fi(ri, si j) from the public value R and his secret element Sj since:
{
ri = R mod pi
si j = Sj mod pi
Using this information any participant can verify the validity of his pseudo-shares by checking their ℓ hashes from table
TH. Similarly, the combiner can check the validity of any pseudo-share submitted during the secret reconstruction pro-
cess using TH as well. Notice, however, that the prime numbers p1, . . . , pℓ should be large enough in order to prevent an
exhaustive search to be performed by an adversary who would compute H(ζ) (where ζ ∈ Z/piZ) until finding a match
amongst the n elements H(fi(ri, si 1)), . . . ,H(fi(ri, si n)).
Figure 1 represents the previous two algorithms. The elements in green are the public elements of T while the elements in
red represent the private elements generated by SetUp. The construction of polynomials F1(X), . . . , Fℓ(X) and F(X) is
depicted on Figure 2 where the elements in purple represent the k1 + · · ·+ kℓ secrets of our VMTMSS.
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s1 1 · · · sℓ 1
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Figure 1: Representation of SetUp and ShareConstruction.
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Figure 2: Construction of polynomials by the dealer.
We will now design SecretReconstruction which is run be combiner to recover the secrets. We assume that Pj1 , . . . , Pjti
are the ti participants wishing to reconstruct the ki secrets of the (ti, n)-threshold scheme. SecretReconstruction is repre-
sented as Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 SecretReconstruction
Input: The threshold value ti, the number of secrets ki, the prime numbers p1, . . . , pℓ, the public table T as well as the
pseudo-shares of the ti participants fi(ri, si j1), . . . , fi(ri, si jti ).
1. Compute xti+1 := A mod pi and yti+1 := F(A) mod pi. For each λ ∈ {1, . . . , ti}, compute yλ := F(Pjλ) mod pi.
2. If δi = 0 then:
2.1. Reconstruct the Lagrange interpolating polynomial passing through the points
(fi(ri, si j1), y1), . . . , (fi(ri, si jti ), yti), (xti+1, yti+1).
2.2. Write the polynomial obtained as:
ti∑
j=0
µj X
j and return µ1, . . . , µki .
Else
2.3. Reconstruct the Lagrange interpolating polynomial passing through the points
(fi(ri, si j1), y1), . . . , (fi(ri, si jti ), yti), (xti+1, yti+1), (fi(ri, s
′
i 1), Fi(fi(ri, s
′
i 1))), . . . ,
(fi(ri, s
′
i δi
), Fi(fi(ri, s
′
i δi
))).
2.4. Write the polynomial obtained as:
ki∑
j=0
µj X
j and return µ1, . . . , µki .
Output: The ki secrets µ1, . . . , µki of the (ti, n)-threshold scheme.
7
3.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we have to demonstrate that our VMTMSS verifies the properties from Definition 3. In particular we have
to argue that the table of hashes TH and the table of extra points T do not leak too much information about the secrets. We
have the following result for our construction:
Theorem 2 The reconstruction algorithm SecretReconstruction is sound.
Proof.
We have to demonstrate that, for any value i in {1, . . . , ℓ}, the elements output by SecretReconstruction are the ki secrets
of the (ti, n)-threshold scheme whatever the family of ti participants is.
Let i be any element of {1, . . . , ℓ}. Consider Pj1 , . . . , Pjti a family of ti participants. Due to Steps 2, 4 and 5 of Share-
Construction, we have the following result:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} ∀λ ∈ {1, . . . , ti} Fi(fi(ri, si jλ)) = F(Pjλ) mod pi
Due to Property P4 of fi, Step 1 of SetUp and Step 6.1 of ShareConstruction, the elements fi(ri, si j1), . . . ,
fi(ri, si jti ), fi(ri, ai) are distinct with overwhelming probability. Since fi(ri, ai) = A mod pi = xti+1, the ti + 1
points (fi(ri, si j1), y1), . . . , (fi(ri, si jti ), yti), (xti+1, yti+1) have different abscissas in Z/piZ. We have two cases to
consider:
First Case: δi = 0. We can interpolate the previous ti + 1 points as in Section 2.1 and denote Lti+1(X) the corre-
sponding Lagrange polynomial obtained at Step 2.1 of SecretReconstruction. It should be noticed that the polynomial
Fi(X) defined at Step 3.2 of ShareConstruction passes through the same points and has degree at most ti (it is exactly
ti if the highest degree coefficient is different from 0). Due to the uniqueness of such a polynomial (see Section 2.1), we
get: Lti+1(X) = Fi(X). Thus, the ki coefficients returned at Step 2.2 of SecretReconstruction are the ki secrets of the
(ti, n)-threshold scheme: Si 1, . . . , Si ki .
Second Case: δi > 0. Using table T , we obtain δi additional points: (fi(ri, s′i 1), Fi(fi(ri, s′i 1))), . . . ,
(fi(ri, s
′
i δi
), Fi(fi(ri, s
′
i δi
))). This leads to a total of ti + 1 + δi = ki + 1 points have different abscissas. We can
interpolate those ki + 1 points as in Section 2.1 and denote Lki+1(X) the corresponding Lagrange polynomial obtained
at Step 2.3 of SecretReconstruction. As Fi(X) passes through the same points and has degree at most ki (it is exactly
ki if the secret Si ki is different from 0) we get: Lki+1(X) = Fi(X). Thus, the ki coefficients returned at Step 2.4 of
SecretReconstruction are the ki secrets of the (ti, n)-threshold scheme: Si 1, . . . , Si ki .

Theorem 3 Our VMTMSS achieves secrecy.
Proof.
Let i be any integer in {1, . . . , ℓ}. Assume that ti− 1 participants pool their pseudo-shares together and use public knowl-
edge from tables T and TH. The participants are denoted Pj1 , . . . , Pjti−1 . Since H is a collision resistant hash function,
H is a one-way function. Therefore, with overwhelming probability, the only information the colluders learn from table
TH is the pseudo-shares of the non-colluding members are different from theirs. Nevertheless, this fact was already known
to each of the n participants due to Step 1 of SetUp, Property P4 and Isomorphism (2). So, table TH does not give any
extra-information to the colluders with overwhelming probability. We have two cases to consider.
First Case: δi = 0. The colluders have to determine the ti+1 coefficients of Fi(X) (Step 3.2 of ShareConstruction). Using
the same technique as in the proof of Theorem 2, they can obtain ti points Fi(X) goes through from their pseudo-shares
and the point (A,F(A)) from T . Consider the set:
E := {(fi(ri, si j), Fi(fi(ri, si j))) : j /∈ {j1, . . . , jti−1}}
The elements of E represent the points owned by the non-colluding members. It should be noticed that the n values
Fi(fi(ri, si 1)), . . . , Fi(fi(ri, si n)) are known to each group participant since they can be obtained by reductions modulo
pi from elements F(P1), . . . ,F(Pn) contained in T . We will see that the probability the colluders can construct an ele-
ment of E is negligible as a function of the length of pi.
Due to Property P4 of the function fi, the colluders know, with overwhelming probability, that the abscissas of the elements
of E belong to:
fi(Di) \
{
fi(ri, si j1), . . . , fi(ri, si jti−1),A mod pi
}
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We would like to draw the reader’s attention to the following point. Once Fi(fi(ri, si µ)) is given, there may be more than
one value x such that Fi(x) = Fi(fi(ri, si µ)). In the worst case we can have up to n − ti + 1 such values for x which
happens when all the ordinates of the elements of E are equal. Thus:
Prob((x, Fi(fi(ri, si µ))) ∈ E, x is built by the colluders) ≤
n+ 1
|fi(Di)| − n
Second Case: δi > 0. The colluders have to determine the ki + 1 coefficients of Fi(X) (Step 3.2 of ShareConstruction).
As before, they can obtain ti + δi points Fi(X) goes through from their pseudo-shares and the δi + 1 points from T . As
previously we get:
Prob((x, Fi(fi(ri, si µ))) ∈ E, x is built by the colluders) ≤
n+ 1
|fi(Di)| − ki
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the range of fi represents a non-negligible part of Z/piZ. At the same time,
we can consider that the group size n and ki is small in comparison to pi so that there exists Ci, independent from pi, such
that, in both cases, we have:
Prob((x, Fi(fi(ri, si µ))) ∈ E, x is built by the colluders) ≤
Ci
pi
Therefore, it is sufficient to pick the smallest of the ℓ primes to be 80 bits long to ensure computational secrecy for our
scheme.

4 Complexity Survey
As claimed in Section 1, the computational and storage costs represent key factors to take into account when implementing
a protocol as a part of a commercial application. In this part we study the cost of our construction and compare it to the
schemes from [2, 19]. In this section we denote M the product of the ℓ prime numbers p1, . . . , pℓ. We assume that picking
random elements from the sets Z/p1Z, . . . ,Z/pℓZ has a negligible computational cost.
4.1 Cost of Our Construction
4.1.1 Computational Cost at the Dealer
Based on Section 2.2, SetUp can be executed in O(n ℓ log22 M) bit operations.
ShareConstruction performs n+D + 3 calls to Garner’s algorithm which results in O((n+D) ℓ log22 M) bit opera-
tions. In addition, there are n+1 polynomial evaluations over Z/MZ. Using Horner’s rule each of them can be done via D
additions and D multiplications in Z/MZ. Based on Section 2.1, this represents a total of O(nD log22 M) bit operations.
There are also δi polynomial evaluations over Z/piZ. If we denote ∆ := max
i∈{1,...,ℓ}
δi then the δ1 + · · · + δℓ polynomial
evaluations cost O
(
∆D log22
(
max
i∈{1,...,ℓ}
pi
))
bit operations. Since each prime number pi is less than M , the total cost
of ShareConstruction is O([D (ℓ+ n+∆) + n ℓ] log22 M) bit operations.
Furthermore, the collision resistant hash function H is run n ℓ times while each keyed one-way function fi is run
n+ δi times.
4.1.2 Computational Cost at the Combiner
Notice that the cost of SecretReconstruction depends on the threshold value ti. We have ti + 2 reductions modulo pi
of elements Z/MZ. This can be done using Euclid’s divisions in O(ti (log2 M log pi)) bit operations. In addition an
interpolating polynomial passing through ti + 1 + δi points is to be build over Z/piZ. We know from Section 2.1 this
can be achieved in O((ti + δi)2 log22 pi) bit operation. Since pi ≤ M , we deduce that SecretReconstruction runs in
O((ti + δi)
2
log2 M log2 pi) bit operations.
4.1.3 Storage of Public Elements
Denote size(x) the number of bits used to represent the natural integer x. We have size(x) = ⌊log2 x⌋ + 1. We define
ρ :=
ℓ∑
i=1
δi size(pi) and ρ′ :=
ℓ∑
i=1
size(pi). We also denote H the bitsize of a digest produced by the collision resistant hash
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function. First, storing TH requires n ℓH bits. Second, T contains n + 3 elements from Z/MZ and 2 δi elements from
Z/piZ for each i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. Thus, the size of T is (n + 3) size(M) + 2 ρ bits. As a consequence, the size of public
elements represents a total of n (ℓH + size(M)) + 3 size(M) + 2 ρ bits. Notice, however, that the sender must buffer all
the elements s1 1, . . . , sℓ n from Step 1 of SetUp which represents nρ′ bits.
4.2 Efficiency Comparison
Our Scheme Chan-Chang’s Scheme [2] Shao-Cao’s Scheme [19]
Thresholds ℓ ℓ 1
Secrets per Threshold ki 1 k
Size Private Values size(M) bits size(p) bits size(p) bits
Table 1: Parameters of the three VMTMSS.
The parameters of the schemes are depicted in Table 1. Notice that the construction by Chan and Chang does not allow
flexibility in the number of secrets to be shared. Indeed, when we iterate that construction λ times (with the same threshold
values) then the total number of secrets has to be λ ℓ. Therefore, we restrict our comparison to the scheme by Shao and
Cao as it enables to choose the number of secrets per threshold independently from the total number of thresholds. Remark
that our construction can be seen as extension of Chan and Chang’s approach providing flexibility. To have an accurate
survey, we assume that Shao and Cao’s construction is iterated ℓ times (one iteration per family of ki secrets). The results
of our comparison are summarized in Table 2.
Our Scheme Shao-Cao’s Scheme [19]
Size Private Values size(M) bits ρ′ bits
Set-up n ℓ random elements n ℓ random elements
Phase
n calls to Garner
Share δi pol. eval. in each Z/piZ n+ δi pol. eval. in each Z/piZ
Creation n+ 1 pol. eval. in Z/MZ
Process
n ℓ calls to H max(ti, ki) exp. in each Z/piZ
n+ δi calls to each fi n calls to each fi
n+D + 3 calls to Garner
Pseudo-Share 1 call to H max(ti, ki) exp. in each Z/piZ
Validity max(ti, ki) exp. in Z/pi−12 Z
Verification max(ti, ki) mult. in Z/piZ
Secret 1 polynomial reconstruction 1 polynomial reconstruction
Recovery
ti + 2 reductions modulo pi
Storage Public n (ℓH + size(M)) + 3 size(M) + 2 ρ (n+ 1) ρ′ + 2 ρ+
ℓ∑
i=1
ti size(pi)
Elements bits bits
Storage Sender nρ′ bits nρ′ bits
Table 2: Computational complexity of the three VMTMSS.
The reader can notice that ρ′ is slightly larger than size(M) so, a priori, our technique does not provide any significant
size benefit from ℓ iterations of Shao and Cao’s construction. As noticed in [2], however, the latter approach requires each
participant to keep multiple shares which can create a share management problem. In our construction, each participant
holds a single "master" share which can be used to recreate the share for each (ti, n)-scheme. We now have two points to
consider.
First, the pseudo-share verification process from [19] is expensive. Indeed, verifying a single pseudo-share roughly costs
2 max(ti, ki) exponentiations in Z/piZ. Even if each of them can be performed in O(log32 pi) bit operations using the
fast exponentiation algorithm [17], the coefficient max(ti, ki) is prohibitive for large thresholds ti. In addition, when the
communication channel is under attack of malicious users flooding the combiner with incorrect values, the coefficient
max(ti, ki) may result in successful denial-of-service attacks as the computational resources needed to identify correct
shares amongst forgeries become too large. This problem does not happen with our construction as only a single hash as
to be computed to validate/discard a share. Notice that each participant first needs to perform 2 reductions modulo pi and
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1 call to fi to construct his pseudo-share from his secret value and the public element R. However, this is at the cost of
running 2n+D + 3 times Garner’s algorithm at the dealer during the set-up and share construction phases.
Second, our pseudo-share verification process requires nℓ hashes to be published as table TH. If we use SHA-256 as
collision resistant hash function then TH is represented over 256n ℓ bits. On the other hand, the construction by Shao
and Cao is secure provided that the discrete logarithm problem over each Z/piZ is intractable. For achieve security, it is
suggested to use 1024-bit moduli or larger [16]. If we assume that the different thresholds are roughly equal to the same
value t then the coefficient
ℓ∑
i=1
ti size(pi) is approximately 1024 ℓ t bits. Therefore, the storage of our public elements less
expensive as soon as t ≥ n4 , i.e. the construction by Shao and Cao provides better space efficiency only for small threshold
values.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we generalized the approaches from [2, 19] by designing a multiple time verifiable secret sharing scheme
allowing several secrets to be shared per threshold value. As in [19], our construction allows any number of secrets to
be shared per threshold value. In addition, we showed that our pseudo-share verification process was much faster than in
[19] while the storage requirements were smaller. We would like to point three facts. First, we assumed that the threshold
values were different (see Section 3). Nevertheless, our techniques could also be employed if some threshold ti is used τi
times provided that different primes pi 1, . . . , pi τi are used respectively. Second, the security of our scheme is based on
the random oracle model for the collision resistant hash function H . Most hash functions used in practice are considered
heuristically collision resistant. Recently several such functions were successfully attacked [21, 22, 23, 24, 26]. In order
to maintain the security of our protocol, we suggest to use a hash function whose security has be proved to be linked to a
computationally difficult problem such as Very Smooth Hash [5] or Gibson’s discrete logarithm-based hash function [7].
Nevertheless, this may result into larger digests or increased running time. Finally the main drawback of our construction
is that we are only able to deal with threshold schemes and our approaches cannot be directly generalized to non-threshold
access structures.
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